

The significance of third party intervention by non-state actors in bringing about a peace settlement. What factors are significant in contributing to a successful outcome to such interventions?

A case in point is the peace agreement in Mozambique realized with Community of Sant'Egidio in Roma.

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Abbreviations

EU	European Union
FRELIMO	The Liberation Front of Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HDI	Human Development Indicators
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
MNR or Renamo	Mozambique National Resistance
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUA	Organization for African Unity
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	The United States

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Introduction

The emphasis on a stronger role for civil society in conflict transformation is clearly in line with an international trend. In 2003, for instance, there was the launch of the GPPAC, a worldwide civil society network established in response to a suggestion by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2001 report *Prevention of Armed Conflict* (2001: 33).

The purpose of this essay will be to show the importance of the third party role in conflict management with the aim of strengthening peace processes. The essay will introduce the typology of intervention of third-parties designed as a part of state/institution, or as part of what is called civil society. The essay will also discuss the definition of third parties, particularly the role of civil society in the form of NGOs.

The essay's core will be to examine the meaningful experience of the Italian NGO 'Comunità di Sant'Egidio' [Community of Sant'Egidio – Rome] to reach the *General Peace Agreement for Mozambique* (1992).

Then the essay will evaluate the intervention with the purpose of identifying the positives, negatives and challenges that involve the management of conflicts.

Finally, the essay will convey a recommendation for researchers and scholars.

Third party intervention: definition, background of third party intervention, types, and the role that can be played by the third party

There are several definitions on the concept of a third-party.

For example the scholar Carol Rank (2010) claims a definition of mediation as a process whereby 'a third party provides *procedural* assistance to help individuals or groups in conflict to resolve their difference', where attention is placed on procedural assistance to the disputants.

Third-party is often used to refer to a person or an entity that is not one of the two involved in some form of relationship (Caritas Internationalis 2002), and is a more generic definition.

In their book Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1992) claim that mediation has been practiced as long as two people have fought, while another person tried to bring the fight to an end, and for them the definition of mediation is 'a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law' (Bercovitch, and Rubin 1992: 7). It is closely related to Marieke Kleiboer's definition (1996: 360), however it is different from the definition advocated by Ruth

Mischnick (n.d.: 121) where mediation is defined as 'an assisted negotiation' with an 'impartial third party' to 'negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement'.

Moreover, there are scholars who are interested in mediator behaviour (Bercovitch, and Houston 2000), others on the mediation style (Beardsley et al. 2006), and on the effectiveness of international negotiation in resolving violent disputes (Jackson 2000) or the successful of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party intervention (Bohmelt 2010). Likewise, Isak Svensson (2007) is focused on the success of mediation, with special attention on government and rebel-biased mediation.

A practical manual containing relevant operational tips for those who do mediation is certainly the text of Besemer (1999).

Finally, in the fascinating and intriguing paper (IRNC 2008), written by Veronique Dudouet, several meaningful ideas and methodologies of nonviolence are described as a technique of cross-border intervention by third parties.

In this paper the term third party describes those entities that engage in a conflict situation.

A conflict in this perspective is an existential condition that cannot be eliminated because it characterizes all human beings. It is not in itself harmful, to be avoided, to pursue a generic harmony that conceals existing conflicts and makes people unprepared when they suddenly explode.

For Heraclitus conflict characterizes the true nature of things, it is the mother and the engine. Everything happens according to law enforcement and the need, '... justice strife and all things come about by way of strife and necessity' (Nuzzo 2007: 294).

There are many key interpretations regarding the meaning of conflict. In relation to this essay the more useful definition is: 'Conflict is a struggle between two or more tendencies of action that are either contrary or in the same direction but mutually exclusive' (Mischnick n.d.: 23).

It is important to also underline that almost all opinion and decision makers recommend the importance of involving third-parties to try to manage conflicts. Bercovitch and Houston (1996:11 cited in Jackson 2000: 323) articulate that there are three possible ways to tackle a conflict when it explodes: win or lose in competition with counterpart, to formulate a sort of negotiation and compromise, or with the support of a third-party.

Furthermore there are four types of third-party mediation styles (Beardsley et al. 2006, and Bercovitch and Houston 2000): the first is based on communication and facilitation where there is a considerable attention to listen the parties, to help them to communicate and to have all possible information; the second is related to manipulation such as a directive intervention, where the third-party introduces proposals to reach an agreement, it offers compensation for the reluctant actors or promises press-

ing and sanctions; the third concerns formulation, aimed at presenting possible new solutions for any stage of the mediation process; finally there is the procedural style where the mediator plays a formal role to control the process and the environment of mediation, then arranging the technical and procedural aspects of managing the information.

In summary, there should be a mutual recognition of the needs of the parties involved, reaching an agreement for a stable and enduring end to violence and destruction created by the degeneration of the conflict.

Role of civil society, rationale that you will focus on NGOs and acknowledge that there are different state and non state interventions

The 21st century has already seen several bloody wars and many harmful situation of conflict. Even after the end of the Cold War, violence has continued at a high level. While human beings were waiting for a long lasting universal peace there were an array of conflicts which were overshadowed or suppressed by the Cold War. These conflicts, together with international terrorism, have emerged in all their gravity in the last two decades and are now of the utmost concern. The nature of violent conflict has changed dramatically. The intra-state and intra-societal conflicts have proved to be especially bloody and destructive.

In particular, the last two decades have seen the growing engagement of civil society and NGOs working in areas of conflict around the world.

In fact, there is an overwhelming international recognition of the need for this type of involvement. In fact not only Kofi Annan stated it in this manner in 2001 (see above), but also the previous UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) that recognized the fundamental importance of civil action for achieving and maintaining peace. He admitted that for such a difficult and complex task, the UN is not able to succeed alone and requires the help and involvement of NGOs, academic institutions, parliamentarians, businesses and professional communities, the media and the public.

In addition, some studies show how important the contribution of civilians is for transforming conflicts. For instance, the multi-track diplomacy enlightened in '*People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*' (State of the World Forum 1999) finally gives witness to the great efforts made by civil society to achieve peace.

There are a number of other entities that lie between the single individual and institutional and international mediation such as UN (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992):

- superpowers such as the US, Russia and China,

- transnational organizations, for example the Vatican State (it cannot be considered a small State because it leads more than one billion people -Roman Catholic Church-);
- Regional organizations, for instance the OAU, OSCE and so on.
- small-State mediators;
- informal mediation by the scholar and practitioner

These organizations can exercise the role of third-party mediator with an obvious difference related to the importance of the role, the resources available, the capabilities and capacity to impose (with benefits or sanctions) solutions. However, each agency of mediation has its drawbacks and only a multi-agency approach has a better opportunity of dealing with all these difficulties. Bohmelt (2010) suggests that by encompassing official and unofficial diplomacy, there is a greater likelihood of realizing an effective outcome. NGOs could be used to organize structure, size and status more effectively to the role of third parties, being able to move more freely from one official level at one unofficial level of mediation and diplomacy.

Case study. Italian NGO. Short introduction of the NGO Community of Sant'Egidio, Rome

The Community of Sant'Egidio (1998-2011) was established in Rome in 1968.

Today it is a movement of lay people and has more than 50,000 members, dedicated to evangelism and charity, in Rome, Italy and in more than seventy countries throughout the world.

The Community is a 'Church public lay association'. Andrea Riccardi was the founder. He gathered a group of high-school students, like himself, to listen to and to put the Gospel into practice.

Service to Peace: Making the World More Human

For the Community, war leads to destruction as well to poverty. Thus love for poor people becomes work for peace. The means of this service to peace and to reconciliation are the weak means of prayer, of sharing difficult situations, meeting and dialogue, and in the transforming power of nonviolence and persuasion.

Some members of the community were facilitators or mediators in Mozambique and in Guatemala, present during the bloody conflict that lasted more than thirty years. Africa, the Balkans, and other areas of the world that are jeopardised by war, are also in the commitment and concerns of Sant'Egidio

The Community has been acting at the international level for a world moratorium on all capital executions since the year 2000. This campaign represents a relevant action

to affirm the value of life, and consequently includes a campaign against anti-personnel mines, aid to refugees and to war and famine victims in Southern Sudan, Burundi, Albania and Kosovo, and so on.

Intervention in Mozambique: background of the conflict, nature of intervention

Mozambique was first explored by Vasco da Gama in 1498 and then colonized by Portugal in 1505. Portuguese colonial rule has been repressive since its formal establishment in 1752.

Guerrilla activity began in 1962 with the founding of FRELIMO. In 1974 there was a coup that ended the military dictatorship in Portugal. A cease-fire was signed in September 1974, and Mozambique became an independent state on June 25, 1975. The first president, Samora Machel, had been the head of the National Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in its ten-year guerrilla war for independence. He died in a plane crash in 1986, and was succeeded by his foreign minister, Joaquim Chissano

The Frelimo chose to establish a Marxist-Leninist policy for Mozambique. The revolutionary imported dogmatism had clashed with the local Mozambicans and had created strong resistance.

Much of Mozambique's population, especially in rural areas, did not approve of:

- the creation of re-education camps,
- the forced collectivization,
- the forced displacement of population to make inhospitable areas productive,
- the marginalization of indigenous traditional authorities,
- sending young people to Cuba for study and for military training.

All these factors led to widespread discontent in 1976 that was the genesis of a movement of anti-communist and anti-government guerrilla opposition named as the Mozambique National Resistance, initially supported by former racist countries Rhodesia and South Africa. However, when the government of Mozambique and MNR began peace talks in Rome in July 1990, the MNR was no longer reliant on other countries; it had control of large parts of the Mozambique territory, and had the support of a significant proportion of the population concentrated in rural areas and in villages.

The talks in Rome, which culminated in a peace deal in 1992, had a long and complex history that this essay will briefly summarize.

At first the Frelimo government underestimated the MNR guerrillas and saw it only as a gang of terrorists and bandits. The government underestimated the military

ability of the guerrillas and especially the political reasons of discontent that gave birth to MNR, and as a consequence it promoted the spread of the antigovernment movement.

The main reasons for which the two sides agreed to engage in the peace talks were the fruit of multiple convergences and opportunities:

- 'Renamo is the tired, the weary Frelimo also' (Morozzo della Rocca 2002: 161) said in an interview by Dhalakama, undisputed leader of the MNR guerrillas,
- for many years the battlefield left a situation of unstable equilibrium where none of the contenders managed to get the victory, and the Frelimo controlled the towns, while the MNR controlled the rural areas,
- the failure of two other attempts to negotiate, one in South Africa in Pretoria in 1984 and one in Kenya in Nairobi in 1989, were two previous negative relationships between the parties, but this somehow indicated a minimum recognition to find a negotiated solution,
- in March 1990 Chissano, Mozambique's President and leader of Frelimo, visited the US. The US President was pushing for a direct conversation between the parties and Chissano, already inclined towards this belief agreed to begin talks 'without preconditions of any kind' (Morozzo della Rocca 1994: 96),
- the commitment of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique since 1976, to support the development of the country decolonization. Moreover, the Community was involved in a work of mediation between the new Frelimo government and the Catholic Church.
- the special role played by Italy to Mozambique, both in terms of international cooperation and economic aid. In the same manner it was expressed by the vicinity politics by the former Italian Communist Party, which also helped the Community of Sant'Egidio in mediation with the Catholic Church and Frelimo.

To these elements it is important to add the crucial insight of the Community not to try to do everything alone, but to create links and contacts with the Italian government, the EU, the Americans, the Portuguese, in short with all those who could play a role in the difficult Mozambican conflict.

The first operational step was to find a direct link to the Renamo. The second step was to push the Frelimo to accept dialogue on equal terms with Renamo, whereas Frelimo instead thought of making concessions. The third step was the involvement of the Italian government to support peace talks in addition to the support provided by the Vatican, from Kenya and the US.

Eventually, the parties came to agree on the will to carry out peace talks in Rome at the headquarters of the Community. The disputants had trust, at that time, not so much of each other, but for the Sant'Egidio Community, because they saw it as a

neutral third-party without vested interests. The Community was strengthened this spirit of confidence, trying to understand the cultural and anthropological causes of conflict, relying on the patience and the need to understand the warring parties and to the real needs and requirements of each of them (Morozzo della Rocca 2002: 16-17). This was the first step in overcoming the mistrust between the parties, suspicion that very slowly dispersed in the twenty-seven months of negotiations. The counterparts met in Rome in July 1990, and when acting as host and observer Riccardi argued that the dialogue had to worry 'to seek that which unites, rather than what divides' (Morozzo della Rocca 1994: 108).

The four mediators were: Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, both of the Community of Sant' Egidio, and Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira.

In May 1991, the underlying problem was clear from the fifth meeting of negotiations. The Renamo believed to represent the Government of Mozambique, the government of Frelimo still only considered Renamo as a group of rebels. The negotiations lacked 'something' that would give recognition and mutual acceptance to the parties. The turning point was given by the delegation of mediators offering a document called the 'Preamble' (Protocol I, Basic principles) as a framework and basis of all negotiation activities (Morozzo della Rocca 2002: 153-159). Afterwards, in eight meetings, two-high-level summits of the Presidents of the two factions, at the negotiating table the formalization of the representatives of U.S., France, Great Britain, Portugal and the U.S. and other difficult and exhausting negotiations brought about the signature of General Peace Agreement for Mozambique on 4th October 1992. The agreement was made of seven protocols on: basic principles; criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties; principles of the electoral act; military questions; guarantees; cease-fire; donors' conference and another four documents.

Assessment/evaluation of intervention; positive, negative and challenges

'The Community of St. Egidio developed a technique which was different to those of the professional peace-makers, but which was complementary to theirs. The Community let its technique of informal discretion converge with the official work of governments and of intergovernmental organisations. Since this experiment, the expression 'Italian formula' has been coined for this unique combination of government work and non-governmental peace efforts. Respect for both parties in conflict and for those who work in this area is indispensable for the success of similar initiatives.' (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict n.d.). In 1993 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary General, spoke thus expressing the mediation of peace concluded by the Community of Sant Egidio. This in itself is

already an assessment that, beyond the authority it expresses, is very clear and informative.

‘Although it was not conducted by professional diplomats, peace negotiations in Mozambique produced refined technical tools, which combined expertise, psychology, historical and legal culture, flexibility and political culture. Paradoxically, the initial feature of outsiders, of impartial mediators but seriously dedicated to the cause of peace, without possible political or economic gain, or international prestige, has been the real point of strength of the whole affair’ (Hume 1994 cited in Morozzo della Rocca 1994: 17). Cameron Hume represented the US during the Mozambique peace talks and also his assertion conveyed the whole meaning of the work of mediation made by the Italian NGO.

With regard to an evaluation of mediation of a NGO, there is no doubt that it has worked with many important aspects that have been wisely combined with each other.

This paper aims to highlight the main aspects.

First of all the objective of mediation was not having a peace agreement to show the world, but the ability to help the parties to embrace most important needs and fundamental of the other, therefore mediators do not think of the spotlight of television, but of the faces of the people involved in the conflict.

Secondly, the Community was able to gain the confidence of litigants, to reach this they did not hurry into fostering solutions. As a result of this they attained two goals: they gained confidence and all signed texts that were very detailed and carefully written, because if things were not adjusted this would have promoted subsequent misunderstandings, fights and even reopening of conflict, as happened in Angola at that time. From this was derived the need for a long consultation time for the various delegations to understand and 'digest' the documents before writing and approval.

Thirdly, mediators dedicated much attention to the cultural and anthropological knowledge of the parties involved with close attention to relations among representatives and understanding human comprehension.

Another commitment was to facilitate the dialogue; with a balanced behaviour where they were able to know how to be firm in their own role, but also to offer more space for constructive contributions. It was a good attitude with the disputants and with government and diplomatic officials, who were probably 'smiling' at the Italian NGO's experience.

Last but not least, the result of peace was not sought in exchange for economic or political advantages, but that the parties fully understood that a continuation of war would not result in any winner. Due to this, the poor means of the Italian NGOs became a resource rather than an obstacle. This was also because mediators knew how to weave both a formal and informal diplomacy, and knew how to relate this to the notice of all who could contribute (it must be kept in mind that towards the end of the negotiation, the representatives of France, Great Britain, the US, Portugal and the

UN became official observers). Among other things there is a skilful amalgam flexibility for avoiding heavy external influences on the negotiations.

On the side of negative evaluation it is possible to imagine that a situation such as that of Mozambique is unique. The Italian NGO was present in a country in which Italy was playing an important role in aid co-operation, long rooted in Catholic territory thanks to the existing network and support of the Vatican, the cold war was over. The contenders were exhausted, even for previous failed attempts to mediate the conflict and there seemed to be no outlet to the conflict.

If the experience could seem an isolated case, the challenges remain current. The lesson that researchers can draw can be very useful for practitioners of mediation and, perhaps, even to diplomacies.

For example, the knowledge that one can succeed in mediation by investing time and patience. Consequently, this mediation should not be used for the benefit of the media and politicians, but of the people involved in the conflict. Third, it must serve to bring out the real needs of the parties in conflict. Only the real needs in the field can identify the controversial passages of the talks.

Fourth, the negotiations must be conducted with firmness, flexibility and humility to accept the contribution of all other and understand when to intervene, and finally with creativity to offer innovative solutions (for instance the Preamble).

Lastly, it is crucial to encourage the mutual acceptance of the parties as a precondition to any agreement, knowing how to construct a system of guarantees and elements of trust between the parties that should come into being and grow stronger during the negotiations.

Another lesson is that it is always necessary to pay particular attention to the background where the mediation will be displayed. It will be necessary to fully comprehend the nature and intensity of the conflict; the conflict context and identity of the party, including their ongoing relationship; the identity of the mediators and the conflict management characteristics with the most important key of the process factors.

A further lesson is on negotiation, which is the principal means of dealing with international contending parties. Third-parties can play a role to settle a general peace agreement or for mitigating the harmful outcomes of a violent conflict situation. Due to this the willingness of disputants to reach a sort of solution for their conflict is required, because they recognize that they cannot achieve a result without the other side. Secondly, the cost of a non settlement of conflict should be unreasonable according to several points of view (diplomatic, economic, and political). Thirdly,

other relevant subjects put pressure on both contenders to accomplish the agreement. Lastly, the third-part could have some significant leverage to use as a reward or coercive power. The latter condition is significant, however it is not fundamental to manage a negotiation, for instance it is the main point of question.

Conclusion

The need to involve civil society and NGOs for the prevention of violent conflict, for peaceful conflict resolution and for assisting societies in deterring wars is being recognized by governments and institutions world-wide.

The civil war in Mozambique has left a legacy of one million dead, 1.7 million refugees abroad, around 4 million IDPs, 200,000 orphans, one third of the population in need of emergency food aid and a country destroyed economically and in all sectors at the level of infrastructure. Nearly two decades after the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Mozambique, all its trials and problems have certainly not been solved. It remains a poor country with a serious health problem linked to HIV / AIDS, but the test of peace can be considered largely overcome.

On the whole, the experience of mediation in civil society, especially if organized as in the case of NGOs, can be very important to mediate conflict. By now everyone at all levels recognize the need for civilians in the work of mediation of conflicts, which are no longer only reserved for diplomats or the military. The case study sketched in this paper is evidence of foregoing. In particular, it may indicate many valuable ways to move ahead, not only in a practical way for the concrete useful insights provided, but also for researchers seeking to explore new dimensions within the vast space of management, transformation, and conflict resolution.

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Appendix 1: map, geography and general information



Map, Image 1

Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/mozambique/>

Geography and Location of Mozambique

The geographical coordinates of the country are 18°15' South latitude and 35° east longitude. Mozambique borders with Malawi, Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania as shown in the Mozambique map. The country also shares its borders with Indian Ocean and Mozambique Channel. 801,590 square kilometers comprise of the total area of the country, of which 784,090 square kilometers is covered by land and the rest 17,500 square kilometers are covered by water bodies. 2,479 kilometers make up the coastline of Mozambique. The highest point of the country is Monte Binga, situated at 2,436 meters above sea level.

Provinces and their Capitals

The Mozambique provinces are: Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Tete, Zambezia, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo.

The province capitals are:

- Xai-Xai
- Inhambane
- Beira
- Chimolo
- Quelimane
- Tete
- Nampula
- Pemba
- Maputo (Capital of Mozambique)
- Lichinga



Map, Image 2

Source: <http://www.imagineafrica.co.uk/images/mozambique%2520map.jpg&imgrefurl=>

Climate

The climate of Mozambique is typically tropical, with a wet season during summer, between October and March, and a dry season from April to September. There is little variation of temperatures between the seasons, differences being dependent on altitude. The wet season brings

the heaviest rain along the coast, and cyclones are also experienced during this period.

General Information

Area Total	801,590 sq km
Area Land	784,090 sq km
Area Water	17,500 sq km
Area Comparative	slightly less than twice the size of California
Land Boundaries Total	4,571 km
Coast Line	2,470 km
Railways Total	3,123 km
Highways Total	30,400 km
Waterways	460 km (Zambezi River navigable to Tete and along Cahora Bassa Lake) (2004)
Ports and Harbours	Beira, Inhambane, Maputo, Nacala, Pemba, Quelimane
Population (2009)	22,849,294
GNI per capita (2009)	\$ 440 *
GDP (2009)	\$ 9,790,246,565 *
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)	55,2% *
Life expectancy at birth (total years)	48 *
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	54% *
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)	2,2% *

External debt stocks (% of GNI)	43% *
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*= Source: The World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/country>

Mozambique HDI: 165

The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. Between 1980 and 2010 Mozambique's HDI rose by 1.3% annually from 0.195 to 0.284 today, which gives the country a rank of 165 out of 169 countries with comparable data. The HDI of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region increased from 0.293 in 1980 to 0.389 today, placing Mozambique below the regional average.

Source: <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en>